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Abstract
This paper analyzes the economic foundations of a non-democratic political regime, where
the ruling bureaucracy captures rents through collective control over state property and job
assignment. The model developed here yields the equilibrium in the “political labor market,” where
the ruling bureaucracy buys services and political support of activists recruited from the working
population. The underlying implicit contract requires that the incumbent bureaucrats retire after a
certain time to allow for deferred promotion of activists into rent-paying positions. The major
implications are that the stability of a non-democratic regime is consistent with high-income gap
between the rulers and the rest of the population, strengthened when government pursues an active
investment policy, and is not directly affected by public goods provision or the rate of economic
growth. The results of econometric analysis of panel data from former Soviet states for the period
of 1956-1968 confirm the predictions of the model.
Keywords: non-democratic regimes, bureaucracy, hierarchy, political support, promotion
incentives, implicit contract, Soviet Union
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For millennia, autocracy was the prevalent form of political organization. Despite the 
advancement of democracy during the last two centuries, the majority of the world’s 
population still lives under regimes that range from outright dictatorship to oligarchy, 
embellished with nominally democratic institutions. Moreover, during the twentieth century, a 
number of industrial and many developing countries reverted to authoritarian regimes after 
periods of significant democratic development. Resilience of non-democratic regimes, 
recurrence of dictatorship, and conditions that enable transition to democracy are therefore 
research problems that need to be addressed by economists. 
Economic analysis of non-democracy and political transitions is a relatively new and 
growing area that was probably prompted by the tide of democratic transitions in the 
developing world and former socialist countries in the late 1980s – early 1990s. Theoretical 
models developed thus far can be divided into two groups. The first group extends 
“Leviathan” interpretation of government (Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, 1980) into 
the area of non-democratic regimes by assuming the rulers who use their power to maximize 
net revenue raised by taxing the dominated population (Mancur Olson, 1993; Martin McGuire 
and Olson, 1996; Boaz Moselle and Benjamin Polak, 2001) or to protect their wealth from 
being redistributed (Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson; 2000, 2001). The second group 
assumes that political power is valuable per se and the rulers’ objective is to maximize the 
extent of power or probability of remaining in power (Herschel Grossman and Suk Jae Noh, 
1994; Ronald Wintrobe, 1998; Yi Feng and Paul Zak, 1999). 
All mentioned works differ in the selection of relevant variables and predictions of 
their models, sometimes diametrically. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), (2001) argue that 
high inequality is the major driving force of democratization, supporting this statement by the 
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fact that the extensions of franchise in West European countries coincided with periods of the 
historical peaks of inequality. In Feng and Zak (1999), a democratic transition is likely to 
occur when a relatively wealthy middle class has a high enough demand for civil liberties 
(which is a sort of luxury good) and can afford a destructive uprising. This approach implies 
that the stability of authoritarianism is consistent with high inequality. Another implication is 
that economic growth undermines a non-democratic regime. At the same time, McGuire and 
Olson (1996) shows that a secure rational dictatorship promotes economic growth. Wintrobe 
(1998) also suggests a possibility of a positive relationship between economic growth and the 
political power of a dictator. The latter work, however, focuses on the loyalty of the 
population “bought” by the dictator in exchange for public goods and on repression as the 
major determinants of regime stability. A similar approach is adopted in Dmitriy Gershenson 
and Herschel Grossman (2001), where the loyalty of the part of the population, coopted into 
the ranks of the ruling elite, is a substitute for repression. Mark Harrison (2002) explains the 
collapse of the Soviet regime by the increasing costs of coercion and decreasing reputation of 
the rulers. The three latter works imply that a stable non-democratic regime is characterized 
by high levels of public expenditure (which includes but is not limited to police expenditure).  
Econometric studies of the determinants of the stability of non-democratic regimes 
and democratic transitions are almost non-existent. One exception is Feng and Zak (1999), 
which finds, in agreement with its theoretical predictions, positive effects of low inequality 
and high levels of education and economic development on the probability of democratic 
transitions in developing countries. Another cross-country study, Robert Barro (1999), yields 
generally similar results with respect to the “propensity for democracy,” which is measured 
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by a subjective index of electoral rights. Finally, Schnytzer and Sustersic (1998) studies the 
party membership in the republics of former Yugoslavia, which they view as the measure of 
loyalty, and find some evidence consistent with the theory of Wintrobe (1998). 
Two major limitations are characteristic to some extent of the literature reviewed 
above. First, most of these works assume explicitly or implicitly that the non-democratic 
regime is imposed upon an economy based on market and private property. Correspondingly, 
two of the three empirical studies mentioned above exclude socialist countries. Second, they 
consider the ruler (a dictator or a ruling elite) as a sort of social singularity, an entity that is 
completely isolated from the rest of the society and has no internal structure. Only 
Gershenson and Grossman (2001) and Moselle and Polak (2001), allow for a connection 
between the ruling stratum and the general population.1 
However the major tendency of a large part of the twentieth century was the rise of the 
regimes that gave more power to the state than ever before in modern history and either 
destroyed the institution of private property completely or marginalized independent 
entrepreneurship. These regimes, often designated as “totalitarian,” spread throughout the 
world in diametrically different ideological packaging: racist/fascist (Germany, Italy, Spain) 
communist (USSR, China, Cuba, and many others), nationalist (e.g. Indonesia, Iraq), or 
theocratic (Iran). They all share a number of common features that provide a stark contrast to 
the principles of free-market democracy. The most important features include: hierarchical 
political organization, open for entry from below; bureaucratic control over the economy, 
                                                 
1 Moselle and Polak (2001) addresses primarily the issues of anarchy and a primitive “predatory” state 
and focuses on an individual’s choice to become a “bandit,” a member of a ruling clique. 
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often backed by direct state ownership of the nation’s capital stock; and significant popular 
support raised through the channels of the ruling party or other similar institutions.  
Most of these regimes have been forcefully removed as a result of military defeat 
(from Nazi Germany in 1945 to Iraq in 2003) or overthrown by popular revolutions (Eastern 
Europe in 1989-91). The remaining regimes of this kind, such as China, North Korea, or Iran, 
are still notable players in the world scenes and the direction of their change is an open 
question. The first and the most lasting regime in this row, the Soviet Union, deserves special 
attention because of extreme features of its political-economic organization, its influence on 
the world political development in 1940-80s, and its rapid and peaceful demise in 1991 that 
occurred despite its seemingly uncompromised coercive power and caused little turnover in 
the higher tiers of economic management and government.2 The Soviet experience raises 
questions about the sources of stability of non-democratic regimes and the limits of their 
sustainability, as well as the potential for endogenous institutional change. In particular, the 
end of the Soviet regime suggests a possibility of the ruling bureaucracy initiating the change.  
The explanation of these developments can be sought for in the political-economic 
exchange between the rulers and the population. Non-democratic regimes, both totalitarian 
and “traditional” dictatorships, are conventionally viewed as based on coercion. Voluntary 
support for the government is often added as a partial substitute to coercion. Support is costly: 
the rulers buy it with public goods or transfers.  If the rulers value only power per se as in 
Grossman and Noh (1994) and Wintrobe (1998), then they can be expected to evolve in the 
long run into welfare-maximizing “benevolent” dictators. If the rulers attempt to protect their 
                                                 
2 Relatively high stability in the ranks of economic managers and bureaucracy has been also 
established for most East European nations (Best and Becker, 1997). 
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wealth from forceful redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000) or destruction (Feng and 
Zak, 1999) by revolutionaries, then they have to give up its political power. Both approaches 
capture certain features of non-democratic regimes but cannot explain the durability of 
numerous “predatory” regimes that extract rents from the population and are characterized by 
high inequality. The assumption of unchallenged power of the dictator in McGuire and Olson 
(1996) simply bypasses the problem of the regime stability by leaving no active role to the 
population. 
For a rational, net-revenue maximizing ruler, who only uses political power as an 
instrument of revenue-collection, public expenditure is simply a tax refund that makes the 
population better off, while reducing political rents.3 Associated transaction costs will 
normally make the net welfare effect strictly negative. If we follow consistently the positive 
perspective and allow for economic rationality of all involved agents, then we have to look 
for less costly, in terms of power and rents, mechanisms of raising support. Hierarchical 
political organization creates one such mechanism that allows for “borrowing” services and 
political support of activists in exchange for deferred promotion into of the ruling stratum. In 
this paper, I develop a model of a hierarchical regime that is based on an implicit promotion 
contract. Stability of this type of a regime is consistent with large income gaps between the 
rulers and the rest of the population, and active government investment in physical capital, 
while the rate of economic growth and provision of public goods have no direct effect on the 
support for the regime. 
                                                 
3 Defense and criminal law enforcement seem to be important exceptions. However, these can be 
considered as a part of the costs associated with revenue production, insofar as they protect the tax 
base from rival predators (foreign aggressors and domestic bandits). 
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The paper is organized follows. Section I introduces the notions of political labor 
market and promotion contract in hierarchies as a mechanism of political-economic exchange 
between the ruling bureaucracy and the population. A formal model of an implicit contract 
between the rent-maximizing bureaucracy and the career-seeking activists is developed in 
Section II. This section also analyzes the characteristics of the equilibrium in the political 
labor market and establishes the limits of a regime’s sustainability. Section III discusses the 
institutional framework of the Soviet political labor market and describes the data that can be 
used to estimate the effects of various economic parameters on the activist recruitment. The 
test of the proposed model using the panel data from former Soviet republics is presented in 
Section IV. Section V concludes. 
 
I. Political-economic exchange in a hierarchy 
 
The most important feature of many, if not most, non-democratic regimes, overlooked 
by the existing literature, is that the rulers are not single dictators or isolated cliques but rather 
top segments of complex hierarchies. There is constant turnover within the ruling strata. A 
‘median dictator’ can hardly keep hold on power for more than a decade, although famous 
examples of longevity, such as Joseph Stalin in the USSR or Joseph Tito in Yugoslavia, might 
have created misperceptions on that part. A non-democratic regime, dictatorial or oligarchic, 
is a political – and often also an economic – monopoly, but paradoxically it creates no 
impassable barriers to entry to the ruling stratum on the personal level. This feature creates 
the possibility to raise support in a way that is consistent with the rationality of political-
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economic agents: by admission of volunteers to the lowest rank of the ruling hierarchy with a 
possibility of subsequent promotion to higher-paid positions. The support obtained in 
exchange for the promise of deferred promotion brings about no losses (transfers to the 
population). To the contrary, it can increase political rents: by recruiting agents from the 
population, incumbent rulers provide an incentive for aspirants to the rent-paying positions to 
volunteer extra effort, for example, in the form of supervisory services that elicit more labor 
effort from the working population. In other words, the rulers can exchange obligations for 
support in the national political labor market.  
For the purpose of tractability, a political hierarchy can be thought of as composed of 
two layers. The first layer, “bosses”, consists of the holders of governing positions (party 
bureaucracy proper). The second, a larger one, “activists,” consists of the aspirants to these 
positions.4 The bosses enjoy salaries and benefits well in excess of the national average, while 
the activists retain ordinary jobs. The activists are required to pay dues, work more, and 
render additional services, in particular, supervisory services. The incumbent elite – the 
bosses – enter the implicit contract with activists, according to which the latter pay “dues” in 
extra labor and supervisory services (as well as in money, e.g. party membership fees) in 
exchange for the prospect of promotion. As long as the activists are content with the terms of 
the contract they also provide political support to the incumbent rulers. In the short run, the 
costs of this arrangement are borne by the activists. Formal admittance to the party does not 
                                                 
4 Formal attributes of the two groups vary across political systems and can change over time. For 
example, in the early period of the Soviet regime, the distinction between the “candidates” – new 
recruits on probation – and the full party members drew the formal line. As the party was growing, the 
class of actual activists came to include part of rank-and-file full party members. However, the relative 
positions of the two groups remained essentially the same. 
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make them better off immediately. Their positions yield a lower utility than that of an 
ordinary worker. Moreover, the probability of being promoted in the future may be quite low, 
because the demand for supervisory agents typically exceeds the number of rent-paying 
positions. However, high inequality, which is the easier to maintain the poorer the country, 
makes pursuit of a bureaucratic career a game with high stakes.5  
The bureaucracy bears its share of costs, too. First, it has to protect its rents against 
potential rivals and overcome resistance of the working population to redistribution of 
national income. This requires permanent coercion of some sort that is costly. Second, the 
incumbent has to repay debt to those activists, who have faithfully performed their duty, by 
promoting them into boss positions. Unless sustained economic growth creates a sufficient 
number of new positions to satisfy the activists’ demand, the incumbent bosses have to repay 
the debt by retiring. As long as the bureaucracy is a collective proprietor, a bureaucrat’s 
benefits are largely ex officio. The possibilities to accumulate personal wealth are narrow and 
therefore post-retirement payments are negligible in comparison to bureaucratic rents. 
Therefore, retirement is a gloomy prospect for a bureaucrat, especially if he internalizes the 
utility of his offspring. 
Incentives for incumbent bureaucrats to enter the contract are determined by returns to 
the activists’ service and the cost of these services – the rents forgone due to “early” 
                                                 
5 What Soviet propagandistic literature used to say about a worker joining the party can be interpreted 
as: more effort, additional duties, promotion to a position in the party bureaucracy or industrial 
management in the future. For example, a Soviet sociological review of 1970s purports: “Once you 
become a communist, you assume voluntarily an additional heavy duty to lead the others.” A 
characteristic career path of a new working class party recruit is described in the following manner: 
foreman – student in an engineering school – head of the planning department in a large enterprise. 
The next step would be further up the ladder of industrial management or to an entry-level position in 
the party bureaucracy. Eighty percent of party bureaucrats of that period followed this career path 
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retirement in compliance with the contract. Without the contract the bosses expect to stay in 
office longer, possibly indefinitely long (if they are hereditary autocrats or private 
proprietors), but the additional rents produced by the activists’ services are lost. The outside 
option of competitive regime based on private property rights always exist potentially. Under 
certain conditions in the political labor market, it may become more profitable than the 
hierarchical regime, prompting the rational bosses to initiate a regime change. 
The effectiveness of the loyal-service-for-promotion exchange depends on the extent 
to which a bureaucracy is capable of controlling the sources of income and, therefore, the 
paths of upward job mobility. Communist states of the twentieth century, by establishing a 
near monopoly on the ownership of productive capital, created the most favorable conditions 
for such a control. In the Soviet Union, a nomenklatura system of job assignment,6 run by the 
ruling party, provided an institutional mechanism for awarding “promotion tickets” in 
exchange for loyal service. Discussion in this paper focuses on the economic incentives for 
both bureaucrats and workers-activists and the determinants of demand and supply of activist 
services under nomenklatura-type arrangements drawing mostly from the Soviet historical 
experience. The Soviet Union is representative for a large class of political-economic 
structures that rely upon the nomenklatura-type exchange between the incumbent rulers and 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Rabochii; pp. 225-234). 
6 M.S.Voslenskii (1984) popularized the use of term nomenklatura as a synonym to the Soviet ruling 
bureaucracy itself. The narrower meaning of “appointment control” is adopted in this paper.  
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the promotion-seeking activists.7 Although some of the results may not be applicable to any 
non-democratic regime, studying the Soviet Union has two major advantages. First, the 
dominant state ownership and fusion of political and economic administration produces a 
single hierarchy. The policies with regard to wages, promotion, job assignments, etc. are same 
or similar in the spheres of administration and production, across industries and regions. 
Therefore, the Soviet-type political-economic system on the whole can be regarded as one 
enormous corporation. This simplifies the analysis and allows applying the methods 
developed for the study of provision of incentives in firms.8 Second, the high degree of 
centralized bureaucratic control resulted in accumulation of data by governmental statistical 
offices. Such accumulation can hardly be expected under a looser regime, in particular in 
countries where bureaucratic rents come largely from corruption and/or where promotion is 
based on family ties and clientelism. Moreover, relevant Soviet data are becoming 
increasingly available. Some of them are used later in this paper to test the predictions of the 
model. 
  
                                                 
7 State property and command economy are not necessary prerequisites for a nomenklatura-type 
system. Any governmental intervention in the economy assigns resource allocation power to 
bureaucracy, and therefore allows capturing political rents through corruption (Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny, 1993). Indonesia is an often-cited example. In general, all authoritarian regimes 
establish some sort of system of bureaucratic control over access to high-income positions beyond the 
borders of the public sector (licensing of businesses and regulation of access to higher education). The 
military-bureaucratic pyramids of Qing China and Imperial Russia in eighteenth century, medieval 
Catholic theocracies and monastic orders are just a few of numerous historical analogs to the 
nomenklatura. Military dictatorships, supported by the hierarchy of army command, are also 
hierarchical political regimes. 
8 See Canice Prendergast (1999) and Irene Valsecchi (2000) for recent surveys of the literature on 
promotion-related incentives. 
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II.  The model 
2.1. Basic assumptions 
Let us consider a population with the size normalized to unity that consists of two 
groups: the bosses and the workers. The bosses’ incomes are essentially political 
(bureaucratic) rents. Individual rents are identical and equal R. The bosses retire after Tb years 
in office. The rest of the population, the workers and the retired bosses, earn a uniform wage, 
W, which is substantially lower than the political rent: W <<R. A part of the working 
population, the activists, provide additional services that benefit the bosses by increasing their 
rents: R = f(Na) > R0 > 0, where f(Na) is the activists’ “rent-production function” such that 
f′(Na) ≥ 0 and f′′(Na) ≤ 0; and R0 is the bureaucrats’ potential per capita rent in the absence of 
activists.9 R0 and W are positive and assumed exogenous. The bosses and the activists 
comprise small fractions of the total population: Nb << 1,10 Na << 1. No specific assumptions 
are made with respect to the ratio of the numbers of bosses and activists. 
Activist service requires extra effort on the part of the workers who choose to enlist as 
activists. No immediate compensation is offered for the service. Each activist volunteers a 
unit of extra effort. However, the workers are heterogeneous in their idiosyncratic distaste for 
activist service – the disutility of the extra effort that the activist service calls for. This 
disutility has an income equivalent of ω i, which is an inverse measure of an individual’s 
predisposition (or ability) for activist service. It is distributed within the population with c.d.f. 
                                                 
9 R0 measures the bureaucrats’ own productivity in rent-collection. R0 is generally greater than zero, 
since a rational worker will not fight corruption or resist predatory taxation beyond the level that 
equates the losses form the latter and the costs of enforcing the rule of law at the margin.  
10 For all practical purposes, the bosses can be assumed not to exceed one percent of the population. 
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Z(ω ) such as Z(0) = 0. The population is homogeneous with respect to all other behavioral 
parameters. In particular, all agents are risk-neutral and discount the future exponentially at 
the rate r. 
Following the approach outlined in the previous Section, I assume that the terms of 
and the returns to the activist service – and consequently the number of activists at any given 
moment in time – are determined by an implicit contract between the bosses and the activists. 
This contract offers the participating activists a possibility of promotion into a boss position 
after Ta years of service and limits the bosses’ tenures to Tb years in order to facilitate 
promotion.11 The probability of promotion is π. Therefore, at the time the contract matures, 
πNa activists become bosses, while (1–π) Na  rejoin the ranks of ordinary workers. 
All agents maximize the expected utilities of residual life-time incomes. The contract 
satisfies the participation constraints as long as (a) an activist’s disutility is compensated by 
expected rents after the end of service and (b) extra rents due to activist services compensate 
incumbent bosses for the loss of rents after retirement. In the absence of contract-based 
exchange between the bosses and the working population, the former never retire (Tb is 
infinite)12 and acquire the rents equal to R0, while the latter earn W forever. There is no 
                                                 
11 Instead of assuming fixed activist effort, variable disutility of service, and random promotion, it 
could be assumed that the workers’ heterogeneity in ability translates into differential productivity in 
the capacity of an activist, in the spirit of the rank-order wage tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981). 
In the latter model, entry-level employees can compete for promotion to a higher-wage level by 
exhibiting varying levels of effort, and the winners – the top N performers – get promotion with 
probability 1. Both incentive schemes have similar effects as long as an individual worker has little 
information on the actions of the others and the distribution of ability within the population. The 
implications would differ with respect to the properties of the bosses: under my approach, average 
ability of the bosses equals the population average, while wage tournaments should produce an elite in 
terms of ability. Discussion of this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
12 Infinite tenure means practically that the bosses are able to bequeath their positions at their 
discretion. 
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outside option for a worker: the only way to achieve a level of income exceeding W lies on 
the bureaucratic career track and it requires activist service. 
As far as the contract design is concerned, the bosses behave as a single entity – the 
representative boss. The contract designed by the incumbent boss is offered to every worker 
who is not and has never been before an activist.13 Although the boss dictates the terms of the 
contract to the activists, he cannot force a worker to enlist as an activist and has to choose the 
contract terms in anticipation of known voluntary response from the workers, given the 
chosen values of Ta, Tb, and π; and the exogenous wage, W.14 The optimal contract is a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium in the boss-activists strategic interaction where the boss is the 
prime mover. The contract is life-long. Once written, it is supposed to be non-renegotiable. 
However, the contracts offered to successive cohorts of activists may differ.  
2.2. Supply of activists 
The choice problem facing an individual worker involves a comparison of two life-
time income profiles. The first assumes a permanent stay in the ordinary worker position and 
receiving certain income. The second consists of the period of costly activist service of 
                                                 
13 The accuracy of the assumption of no reentry into the ranks of activists depends on the extent of 
factional struggle within the ruling party. Swings in the power struggle may let previously purged 
activists restart their careers. Thus, for example, almost all surviving victims of the Cultural 
Revolution in China (1966-1976) were eventually rehabilitated (Lee 1991). 
14 Theoretically, a single boss, who combines political and economic power, could endogenize wage in 
the present context. However, the division of responsibility within the ruling bureaucracy makes it 
practically impossible to align the contract design by political leaders with wage setting decisions by 
production managers (planners), even if the latter belong to the stratum of bosses in terms of my 
model. Maxim Boycko et al. (1995) argue that the separation of control rights from cash-flow rights 
under centrally-planned economy was the major source of economic inefficiency of the Soviet system. 
In the theoretical framework of this paper, it results also in political inefficiency by preventing the 
designers of the promotion contracts from controlling wage. This issue is further discussed in Section 
2.6. 
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duration Ta, uncertain promotion to the higher-income boss position thereafter, and retirement 
after Tb years in office if promoted respectively. Worker i makes the choice to become an 
activist if the expected income along the bureaucratic career path exceeds the income as an 
ordinary worker, given his personal ability:15 
(1)  
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Inequality (1) yields the cutoff level of disutility ω∗ that determines activist participation: 
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The supply of activists – the number of workers for whom ω i < ω∗ holds under a given 
contract – is then the left tail of the distribution of the disutility from the activist service: 
(3)  ( )*ωZN sa = . 
Since the activists constitute typically only a relatively small proportion of the total 
population, Na << 1, Z can be approximated with a linear function so that (3) becomes, Na
s = 
ζω∗, where ζ is a constant. In addition, let us measure time in units of the term of activist 
service, Ta, so that Ta ≡ 1.16 Then the supply of activists is expressed as: 
                                                 
15 Post-retirement income flows are not included in the expression, since they are identical for all 
agents by assumption. 
16 This approach is justified by the fact that the activist service is typically institutionalized (for 
example, as a probationary period for a new party member or the length of military service for a 
recruit) and its duration is fixed at least in the short run. By contrast, the tenures are seldom regulated 
explicitly and its actual length fluctuates as a result of policy changes or political perturbations. Note 
that a change in the term of activist service ceteris paribus translates, by rescaling the time axis, into an 
increase in the rate of future discounting and a decrease in the length of boss tenure in an equal 
proportion. 
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(4)  ( )( )brTsa eWRN −−−= 1πκ ,   
where κ = ζ /(e–r – 1). 
It is can be easily verified that the supply of activists increases in the expected rents 
(boss rent17 and tenure, and the probability of promotion) and decreases in the value of the 
next best alternative for a worker (workers’ wage):  
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2.3. The bosses’ problem 
At the core of the representative boss’s choice problem is the tradeoff between 
additional rents provided by the activists and the limitation of tenure that the provision of 
incentives for the activists implies. The bosses, entering the contract with the activists, seek to 
maximize their residual life-time rents: 
(7)  ( )∫ −= b
T
rt
a dteNfR
0
 
To achieve this goal, they choose the probability of promotion, π, and the length of tenure, Tb, 
taking into account the workers’ response expressed in the form of the supply of activists (4). 
                                                 
17 Boss rent, R, as introduced in Section 2.1, is a function of the number of activists. However, an 
individual worker has no information on the outcomes of the current and future recruitment campaigns 
at the time he or she is making the decision to become an activist. Therefore, R in the expression for 
the supply of activist should be interpreted as an exogenously determined expectation of rent, which 
does not generally satisfy R = f(Na). This identity should hold in the long-run equilibrium, but since 
the regimes of the type discussed here are relatively short-lived, the long-run equilibrium may never 
be reached. 
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An additional stationarity constraint to their problem results from the necessity to balance the 
inflow of promoted activists and retiring bosses:  
(8)  
b
b
a T
N
N =π . 
To simplify further analysis, let us combine the two constraints, by plugging (8) into (4) and 
rearranging the terms: 
(9)    ( )[ ] 21/1 brTba TeRNN b−−∆= κ ,   
where ∆R = R – W is the boss premium. Hereafter, the combined constraint (9) is referred to 
as the feasible supply of activists. 
The representative boss’s problem is then: 
(10)  ( )∫ −b
T
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max  
subject to (9). 
The bosses’ objective function (7) can be characterized by the lines of equal levels of 
residual life-time rents in the (Tb, Na) plane – isorents. The optimal solution to the problem 
(10) – an equilibrium in the regime’s political labor market – is attained at the point of 
tangency of an isorent and the feasible supply curve in the (Tb, Na) plane that corresponds to 
constraint (9). Replacing the left-hand side of (7) with an arbitrary constant, integrating the 
expression, taking logs, and rearranging term obtains an algebraic expression for the isorent: 
 (11)  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−= −
−
brTa e
rCfN
1
1 . 
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The isorent (11) is a downward-sloping and convex curve. It behaves approximately as a 
hyperbolic curve Tb-α with α > 1 n the vicinity of Tb = 0 (since f(Na) is a concave function) 
and approaches a horizontal asymptote at Na = f -1(rC) as rTb approaches infinity. 
The derivative of feasible supply (9) with respect to boss tenure is: 
( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+−−∆= −−−− −− bbb rTrTbrTbbba reeTeTRNdT
dN 21212123 1121 κ  
Rearranging terms and substituting (9) into the expression above obtains: 
(12)  ( )( ) 01
2
11 <−+−= −− brTba
b
a erT
N
dT
dN
 for any Tb > 0.18 
Therefore, feasible supply is a downward-sloping curve in the (Tb, Na) plane. Its maximum 
value is reached at Tb = 0 and equals: 
(13)    RrNN ba ∆= κmax  
which sets the upper boundary on the number of activists under given regime parameters.19  
 The feasible supply curve is also convex, but its curvature is systematically lower than 
that of an isorent. 20 This guarantees the existence of a unique interior solution to problem 
(10). A typical configuration of an isorent and the feasible supply constraint is presented in  
Figure 1. The first-order condition to the problem (10) is: 
                                                 
18 The term in brackets, ( ) 01 11 <−+− −− brTb erT , can be rearranged to obtain rTb + 1 < e rTb, which 
holds for any Tb >0 by the properties of the exponential function. 
19 By the L’Hopital rule, 
0
lim→bT
(1 – e–rTb) / Tb = re–rTb = r. In fact, the maximal sustainable number of 
activists falls short of that given by (13) and is determined by the bosses’ participation constraint 
discussed later in this in section. 
20 Proof of this statement can be obtained from the author. 
 19 
 
(15)  ( )( )( ) ( )( )  01  erTNfeTNf
dT
dN
bb rT
ba
rT
ba
b
a =+−′ −−  
Substituting the expression for dNa/dTb from (12) and rearranging terms obtains: 
(16)  
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) brT
b
ba
baba
rTe
rT
TNf
TNfTN
a −−=
′
1
2
 
that determines the optimal tenure and, implicitly, the optimal probability of promotion.  
Representation (16) of the first-order condition separates conveniently the effect of the boss 
tenure (on the right-hand side) from the productivity of activists services (left-hand side).  
To analyze the comparative statics of the equilibrium in the political labor market, let 
us consider the two sides of (16) as the functions of Na, denoting the left-hand side expression 
X(Na) and the right-hand side Y(Na) = Y(Tb(Na)). The inverse feasible supply function, Tb(Na), 
can be obtained from (12). The solution to (16) is therefore the point of intersection of the two 
curves X(Na) and Y(Na). Under this approach, the position of X(Na) depends exclusively on 
the properties of a given f(Na), while the position of Y(Na) is affected by the same parameters 
as the supply of activists. It can be shown that Y(Na) has the following properties: Y′(Na)>0, 
Y′′(Na)>0, Y(0) = 0, it has a vertical asymptote at RrNN b ∆= κmax , and its slope is 
proportional to the inverse of Nmax.21 An immediate implication is that the equilibrium number 
of activists is affected by exogenous changes in bosses rents and wages in the same way as 
the supply of activists and increases in the number of bosses: 
(17)  .0  ,0  ,0
***
>∂
∂<∂
∂>∂
∂
b
aaa
N
N
W
N
R
N
 
                                                 
21 Proof of this statement can be obtained from the author. 
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These three derivatives can be jointly interpreted as a positive effect of expected rent – the 
product of the boss premium and the probability of promotion – on the equilibrium number of 
activists. 
2.4. Production technology  
Further analysis requires specification of the activists’ production function, f(Na). I 
argued earlier in this paper that activists serve primarily as labor supervisors. Activists-
supervisors, whose function is to elicit a higher level of effort from fellow workers, can be 
considered as a sort of labor-augmenting technology. Then the rent-production function can 
be represented as:  
(19)  f(Na) = F{K, (1+aNa) L},  
where K is capital, L is labor, a is a productivity parameter. F(K,L) is the production function 
of the economy such that: FK >0, FL >0, FKK <0, FLL <0, FKL >0. 
Under these conditions, the left-hand side of (16) becomes: 
(20)  X(Na) = aNa FL L/F.  
Obviously, X(Na) >0, X(0) =0. In addition, X′ (0)>0, and X(Na) reaches the maximum at a 
certain point, which may or may not lie within the range of admissible values of Na, to the left 
of min(1, RrNb ∆κ ). To verify the latter properties, let us are differentiate X(Na) with respect 
to the number of activists: 
(21)  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+=−+=
F
FFaLNF
F
aLFaLNFFaLNF
F
aL
dN
dX L
LLaLLaLLaL
a
2
2
2
2  
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At Na = 0, (21) collapses into aLFL/F2 and therefore X′ (Na) >0 at low levels of Na.. Since the 
factor in round brackets is negative and the second term increases in absolute value with an 
increase in Na, X′′ (Na) < 0.22  
A typical configuration of X(Na) and Y(Na) for this specification is presented in Figure 
2. The number of activists in equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the two curves.  
A change in the parameters that leads to an increase in RrNN b ∆= κmax  causes a rightward 
shift of Y(Na) and consequently an increase in the optimal number of activists. The position of 
X(Na) is affected by the changes in labor and capital employed in the economy. To determine 
how, let us consider the derivatives of X(Na) with respect to capital and labor. The position of 
X(Na) depends on the elasticity of output with respect to labor input FL L/F. If the production 
technology has unitary elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, FL L/F does not 
depend on factor proportions.23 If the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, then FL L/F 
increases and X(Na) curves fan out as the capital-labor ratio increases. Since less-than-unitary 
elasticity of substitution is the only practically relevant possibility on the macroeconomic 
level,24 we can expect: 
(22)  .0  ,0
**
<∂
∂>∂
∂
L
N
K
N aa  
                                                 
22 The second term may exceed FL to the right of some point N^. In that region, X(Na) bends down. 
Alternatively, X′ (Na) may remain positive as Na → ∞. In both cases, X(Na) is concave. 
23  X(Na) = aNa (1 –  α)/(1+ aNa ) in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function, where α is the 
capital share. 
24 Numerous empirical studies show that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is 
typically less than one for most modern economies. In particular, this applies to the Soviet economy. 
See further discussion in Section 4.1. 
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An important implication is that government investment in physical capital calls for 
increasing numbers of activists. The intuition behind this result is that, with a substantial 
degree of complementarity between effective labor input and capital, more activists-
supervisors have to be hired to elicit additional effort from workers to match an increase in 
capital. The opposite is true with respect to an increase in the labor force, since activists-
supervisors are technically substitutes for crude labor input by assumption. Note also that the 
marginal effect of an increase in the capital-labor ratio on the magnitude of FL L/F, and 
consequently on the position of X(Na), curves diminishes as the capital-labor ratio increases. 
This means that the link between investment policy and the recruitment of activists is going to 
weaken with the accumulation of capital in the economy. 
2.5. Bosses’ participation constraint and regime change  
I now turn to the discussion of conditions that make the equilibrium in the political 
market unattainable. An alternative to the regime with collective ownership and rotation of 
the ruling bureaucracy is the one that is based on private property rights and lacks the support 
of activists. Rational bosses will choose not to renew the contract with the activists if the 
latter option promises an absolute advantage over the former. Let us assume that the bosses 
have a time horizon of Tm, which is determined exogenously and reflects the perceived 
stability of the regime. Tm may be infinite (if the current regime is believed to be everlasting) 
and in any case: Tm > Tb. The bosses choose to enter into a promotion contract with the 
workers at a moment T=0 if the rents accumulated over the period of tenure, Tb, are expected 
to exceed those in the absence of activists’ support (R0 per period of time for Tm periods): 
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(24)  ( ) ∫∫ −− ≥ mb
T
rt
T
rt
a dteRdteNf
0
0
0
. 
Integrating, taking logs, and rearranging term yields 
(25)  ( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−≥ − mrT
a
b eNf
R
rT 11ln 0 . 
The numerator of the fraction in (25) lies between 0 and 1. Under the assumption that the 
activist services contribute significantly to the bosses’ capability to collect rents, ( )aNf >>1, 
the bosses’ contract participation constraint approximates as: 
(26)  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≥
−
−
b
rT
a rT
eRfN
m1
0
1 , 
which is a hyperbolic curve.  
Expression (26) determines the lower boundary of a region in the (Tb, Na) plane, 
where the contracts acceptable for the bosses are located. The point of tangency between the 
participation constraint curve and a feasible supply curve is the boundary optimal contract. At 
this point the bosses are indifferent between maintaining the contract and the change of 
regime (Figure 3). Its location is determined by the productivity of activists captured by the 
parameters of the function, f, and the bosses’ perception of the regime’s durability, Tm. In 
particular, it follows from (26) that insecure geopolitical environment and/or internal 
instability, by decreasing Tm, depress the participation constraint curve and expand the region 
of acceptable contracts, adding flexibility to the regime. Conversely, a declining threat of 
aggression or uprising causes the region determined by (26) to shrink, thus making it more 
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likely that the bosses choose not to enter in the promotion contract and abandon a collectivist 
regime. Another theoretical possibility is a reduction in the effective rate of future 
discounting, r, due to expectations of sustained economic growth. Higher expected rates of 
growth reduce r, and consequently increase the argument of f -1 in (26), shifting the 
participation constraint curve upwards. This implies that bureaucratic regimes may be 
incompatible with permanent high rates of economic growth.25  
It is not only the change in the bosses’ expectations that, by affecting the location of 
the participation constraint, can cause regime change but also a downward shift of the supply 
curve. Real wage increases are of particular importance in this context. As was noted earlier, 
wage setting in a most centralized command economy is a matter of economic decision-
making. This process is institutionally separated from the design of optimal contracts for the 
political labor market. The industrial bureaucracy may find it beneficial to increase wages to 
stimulate higher productive effort on the part of ordinary workers, especially when the 
productivity of activists-supervisors does not yield desirable results. Paul Gregory (2003) 
argues that the efficiency wage considerations were not foreign to the Soviet leadership and 
their influence on the economic policy was notable. Therefore, economic efficiency and 
political support are generally contradictory objectives. While pursuing the former, 
bureaucrats-managers can lower boss premiums. This depresses the supply of activists to the 
point when the bosses’ participation constraint can no longer be satisfied.  
                                                 
25 This is unconditionally true only if all the bureaucrats and workers expect their rents and wages 
respectively to grow at the same constant rate, which is a restrictive assumption. However, low growth 
rates are typical of most historical non-democratic regimes. The rates of Soviet GDP per capita growth 
seldom exceeded three percent per year, and higher rates of growth did not always translate into 
significant increases in per capita consumption (see Gur Ofer, 1987). Therefore, growth rates per se 
never appeared to challenge the stability of the regime in the USSR. The future development of the PR 
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Finally, the ability of the ruling bureaucracy to raise support in the political labor 
market depends on its ability to control the paths of upward income mobility. Thorough 
control is never possible. Two major avenues lead to higher incomes that are, at least in part, 
independent from the bureaucratic control: higher education and the shadow economy. In a 
small and primitive economy, this problem can be contained. A more complex economy 
requires, on the one hand, more human capital. This brings about opportunities for higher 
incomes for “apolitical” professionals. On the other hand, there is more space for illicit 
economic activity, especially in services. Both undermine the regime by carrying off potential 
activists, who respond to economic incentives outside of the state-controlled economy. 
Therefore, modern economic development produces downward pressure on the supply of 
activists and sets the natural limits to the growth of hierarchical regimes. 
 
III. The Soviet political labor market: Institutional framework and data sources 
 
The dataset I use to test the model is a panel of nine states (republics)26 of the former 
Soviet Union. The data cover the period of 1956-1968, roughly coinciding with the leadership 
of Nikita Khrushchev. This period is characterized by rebounding influx of activists 
(increasing admission of candidates to the party) after a trough of the mid-1950s. Economic 
development of the period is characterized by the relatively high rate of growth (about 4% per 
year) and active investment policy, although there was a marked decelerating trend. There 
were no significant political and economic shocks during this period, and the institutional 
                                                                                                                                                        
China may inform us on the impact of sustained growth ion the stability of a bureaucratic regime. 
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setting remained largely unchanged. Neither purges in the ruling party nor massive 
recruitment campaigns occurred during that period. Therefore, equilibrium promotion 
contracts should dominate throughout this period.  
The primary goal is to show that the changes in the number of communist party 
candidates – activists in terms of the model – can be explained by changes in the variables 
that can be associated with certain parameters of the model. In the overview that follows I 
describe the institutional features of the Soviet political labor market and the available data 
that can be used in the empirical analysis.  
3.1. Institutional setting 
Hierarchy. The Soviet communist party hierarchy was almost an exact match to the 
hierarchy of administrative (territorial) units. The latter include (top down): union, republic, 
oblast, district/independent city/urban district, primary party organization (PPO). The Russian 
Federation, the largest Soviet republic, had no separate party structure, its oblasts 
administrations reported directly to the union (national) government and oblast party 
committees directly to the party Central Committee. “Independent city” is a relatively large 
city subordinated directly to oblast and is not affiliated with any district. Urban districts 
existed only in large cities and were comparable in population to rural districts and most 
ordinary independent cities. PPOs were typically associated with industrial enterprises. Most 
primary party organizations had no paid officials on top. Secretaries of PPOs were paid only 
in the largest enterprises. 
                                                                                                                                                        
26 No reliable data is available for the remaining six republics. 
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The number of bosses and average boss salaries by republic are the functions of the 
number of territorial units in every hierarchical level. Changes in administrative (territorial) 
structure translate automatically into creation and destruction of party bodies and, 
consequently, changes in the number of paid positions for party officials, i.e. the number of 
bosses in terms of the theoretical model. Territorial structure was subject to frequent 
reshuffling. Districts were split and merged every year; independent status could be given to a 
city and withdrawn a year after. This implies that changes in territorial structure provide for 
substantial cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in the number of bosses and salaries. 
Party membership. The rules of the Soviet Communist party (as in other communist 
countries) specified a trial period for new members. During this time, new party recruits were 
titled candidates. Upon passing the candidate review successfully, they became full party 
members. Although the probability of promotion into the full membership exceeded 90%, 
only a small share of the latter actually remained on party career tracks and was able to reach 
a position in the party bureaucracy. The latter constituted around one percent of total party so 
that the probability of promotion into the “bosses” (in terms of the model developed in this 
paper) was of the order of 0.01. The remaining majority of rank-and-file full party members 
enjoyed minor non-pecuniary benefits of membership (such as softer punishment in case of 
criminal prosecution, preferential right to occupy certain types of jobs, etc.) and typically 
remained in the party until death. 
The proportion of candidates in the total party membership declined from about eight 
to five percent over the period of 1956-69 on average. There was, however, a substantial 
variation in the rate and even the direction of change across republics. The reduction was 
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largely due to increasing numbers of full party members, resulting from a rapid mortality 
decline in this period. At the same time, the ratio of party candidates to the total labor force 
fluctuated around 1:100 without any significant trend. 
 Benefits of party membership. Party membership was normally a prerequisite for 
appointment to a top managerial position in all spheres of the economy or for pursuing a 
career in government: civil administration, economic control, or party. A position of a 
“leading party worker” (party bureaucrat) was of the utmost importance. There is no 
indication that party membership per se did pay, but party bureaucracy did receive substantial 
rents in the form of high salaries and fringe benefits. A major part of the party organizations 
expenditure, according to national party budgets (RGASPI), was geared to provide benefits to 
paid party officials, the remainder being used to cover operational expenses and to finance 
propaganda campaigns. Salaries of paid party officials constituted only a minor portion of 
their rents. Fringe benefits (health and child care subsidies, relocation packages, etc.) and 
non-monetary rewards, such as free housing financed from party budgets, constituted a more 
significant part of their real incomes. 
3.2. Available data 
Party membership. Numbers of candidates and full members are available on the 
national level for the whole period of the existence of the Soviet communist party. Republic 
level data are available for 1956-1968 (UFFA). Significant lacunae in the time series restrict 
the dataset to only nine republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In post-Stalin years, the candidate trial period was 
close to one year, so the number of candidates for a given year equals approximately the 
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number of new activists. As demonstrates, there is a significant variation in the rates of 
recruitment across the republics, although the end of the period is marked with convergence, 
probably due to increasing pressure from the central party leadership. 
Party budget, available from archival sources (RGASPI), records total expenditures of 
the Central Committee (actually, including a number of affiliated central bodies) and 
territorial organizations. The latter are the aggregate numbers for all administrative units 
below the national level. The breakdowns by particular republics and oblasts are available 
only for 1962 and 1964. No data for lower-level units are available. Notwithstanding its 
limitations, this source is indispensable and, to the best of my knowledge, has never been 
published, let alone used for analytical purposes. 
Party bureaucracy. Numbers of bureaucratic positions and salaries are available for 
most years from 1940 to 1965 separately for each hierarchical level. Breakdowns by republic 
are available for 1950, 1962, and 1964. Comparison of national aggregates of party payrolls 
and total expenditure by territorial party organizations shows that payrolls constituted an 
almost fixed percentage of party budgets: 5.8 ± 0.3% in 1955-65. Since no budget data on any 
units below the national level is available, I use the data on salaries (averages by republic and 
by level in the hierarchy) as a proxy for bureaucratic earnings/rents. The same sources 
provide office size data (the number of bosses per administrative unit). 
Salaries vary significantly (30%) with the level in the hierarchy but exhibit very low 
variation across republics – 2-3% within each hierarchical level. Therefore, the territorial 
structure of a republic (numbers of units in each level) is likely to be the most important 
determinant of variation in the party payroll and, consequently, in the average salaries by 
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republics. Although salary constituted only a part of the total remuneration of a party 
bureaucrat, it is quite likely that fringe benefits varied with salaries. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that illicit incomes of corrupt officials might also have been significant. However, no 
reliable data are available on the extent of corruption.  
No precise information is available on party bureaucrats’ tenures. The period of Nikita 
Khrushchev’s leadership was characterized by relatively high rates of job mobility within the 
bureaucracy, especially until 1961 when the last of Stalin’s lieutenants were ousted from the 
Central Committee.  
Territorial structure data are available from published sources (Narodnoe khoziaistvo 
SSSR) for 1956-1968 (as well as later years) for every republic in the sample. 
Demographic and economic data are available from published sources, mostly from 
annual statistical compilations (Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR). Series of interest include labor 
force,27 nominal wages, retail sales, various indicators of public consumption, indices of 
industrial output, and annual investment in the economy. Capital stock data are not available. 
All nine republics in the sample are relatively small and internally homogenous. The largest 
republics are Uzbekistan and Belarus (population around 8 million each, in 1959); the 
smallest republic is Estonia (just below 1 million).  
3.3. Reconstruction of missing data 
Testing the model requires data on the number of paid party positions (the number of 
bosses) and their salaries for each republic for each year. Complete cross-tabulations of this 
                                                 
27 Labor force practically equaled employment in the USSR. Published labor force data do not include 
employed in largely subsistence collective farms, around one fifth of the total working age population. 
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sort are available only for one year – 1962. In addition, the numbers of bosses and their 
average salaries by republic  (without separation into hierarchical levels) are available for 
1964. My approach is based on the assumption that changes in territorial structure are the 
major source of changes both in the number of bosses (due to change in the total number of 
units) and in average salaries (due to change in the hierarchical level mix). An advantage of 
this approach is that it relies on the data on territorial structure that are easily verifiable and 
hardly could be subject to any deliberate distortion unlike many other series of policy-related 
data.  
I use two methods to impute missing data on the salaries and the size of party 
bureaucracy. Under the first method, assuming constant republic differentials in pay and 
office size (the number of bosses per unit) by level (from 1962 data) and applying common 
trend in these variables (from the annual national data), I calculate the numbers for each level 
for each republic and aggregate them to obtain republican average salaries and the total 
numbers of bosses. The second method is to regress average republican salary and office size 
data for 1962 and 1964 against territorial structure data and national averages for these years, 
and use predictions of these models. The numbers of PPOs and the salaries of their personnel 
exhibit relatively high variation across republics and are strongly correlated with the total 
number of urban settlements by republic. Moreover, higher numbers of these units and 
salaries are characteristic of more urbanized and industrial republics. For these reasons, I use 
a common “all cities” variable, as well as republic-specific coefficients, in the regressions. 
Regression models for imputing salaries and boss numbers are reported in Table 1. Aggregate 
dynamics calculated on the basis of thus imputed salaries and boss numbers is in good 
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agreement with national trends with the exception of 1958, when the two largest republics in 
the sample, Belarus and Uzbekistan, underwent territorial reorganization unmatched in its 
scale in the rest of the country.  
 
IV. Empirical implementation and estimation results 
4.1. Empirical specification 
Empirical studies (Martin Weitzman (1970), William Easterly and Stanley Fisher 
(1995)) show that the Soviet economic growth is consistent with a CES production function 
with the elasticity of substitution of 0.4.28 Therefore the generic specification (19) can be 
replaced with: 
(27)  ρ
ερρ ]))+(( + =)( LaN [K Nf aa 1 , ε ≤ 1, ρ < 0. 
Accordingly: 
(28)  ( ) 11/ −])+( + =)( ρρρε aaa aNLK[aN  NX . 
Since reasonable numbers of activists are small (Na ~ 10-2), (28) can be approximated 
for negative values of ρ (less than unitary elasticity) and with:   
(29)  βα )/()( LKakNNX aa = ,  where k > 0, 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1.29 
                                                 
28 Although some authors (see Padma Desai, 1987) find that Soviet postwar economic growth is 
consistent with unitary elasticity of substitution, elasticity below one seems to be typical for 
developing economies. It has been identified, for example, for the South Korean economy (Ky-hyang 
Yuhn, 1992) and many others. John Duffy and Chris Papageorgiou (2000) find that less developed 
economies, as a group, are characterized by less-than-unitary elasticity of substitution.  
29 Note that α and β here are only to parameterize the approximation of X(Na) and bear no meaningful 
relationship to ρ and other parameters of (28). Estimation of the latter is beyond the scope of the 
present research. 
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Similarly, it can be shown that for reasonable values of the number of activists and 
parameters:  
(30)  δγ κ )()( RrNbNNY baa ∆≅ , where γ > 1, δ < 0. 
Figure 4 presents an example of a family of X(Na) curves (28) and their 
approximations (29) corresponding to the elasticity of substitution 0.4 (ρ = −1.5), constant 
returns to scale, various capital-labor ratios in the vicinity of K/L = 1, and the productivity 
parameter a = 10. Parameter values in (29) – k = 0.204, α = 0.838, β = 0.684 – were obtained 
by minimizing the unweighted sum of squared errors of approximation over the range of Na 
from 0.002 to 0.06.  
Combining (29) and (30), taking logs, rearranging terms, and relabeling coefficients 
obtains the reduced form equation: 
(31)  ln(Na) = β0 + β1 ln(Nb) + β2 ln(∆R) + β3 ln(K/L), 
where β1 > 0, β2 > 0, 0 < β3 < 1, as follows from (29) and (30). 
I use the number of party candidates for the number of activists. This is an accurate 
proxy, since the candidate term in the studied period was about one year on average. The part 
of the population relevant in the context of activist recruitment is practically limited to young 
male workers – a vast majority of new candidates were recruited from this stratum. Because 
of the absence of adequate age and gender distribution data, the total labor force is used 
instead. The bureaucratic premium, ∆R, is the gap between bureaucratic rents, R, and the 
workers’ real wages. The former are approximated with average salaries of the party officials. 
Several variables are used as the indicators of the real wages. Because of the typical for the 
Soviet economy price distortions, pervasive shortages in consumer markets and absence of 
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opportunities for private investment, nominal wage data are of little use. Retail sales, RS, per 
worker is therefore a measure of consumption expenditure per wage earner. RS should have a 
negative effect on the number of activists. Three indicators of public consumption – 
enrollment in higher education institutions, ST, new public housing construction in square 
meters, NH, and physicians per capita, PH – should also have a non-positive effect (negative 
if provision of public goods is correlated with wages and zero otherwise). In addition, 
enrollment in the institutions of higher education serves as a proxy for the availability of the 
“outside option” for potential activists: non-party professional careers.30 Therefore, enrollment 
is likely to have a strictly negative effect on the number of activists. Finally, investment 
measures, investment per worker and the change in investment rate, used here as correlates of 
the changes in the capital-labor ratio should have positive effect of less-than-unitary 
magnitude.   
The model is estimated using first-order log differences in order to exclude the time 
trend and fixed effects. The complete empirical specification is given by: 
(32)   ∆ln(Na it) = β0 + β1 ∆ ln(Nb it) + β2 ∆ ln(R it) + β3 ∆ ln(RS it) + β4 ∆ ln(L it)  
+ β5 I it + β6 ∆ ln(ST it) + β7 ∆ ln(PH it) + β8 ∆ ln(NHit) + εit , 
where I it replaces K/L in the prototype specification (31) and is alternatively log of 
investment per worker, ln(I/L), or the change in investment rate, ∆ ln(I/Y).  
                                                 
30 Because all education was free of charge, demand for college education (number of applicants) 
typically exceeded admission. Therefore, total enrollment is equivalent to the number of “promotion 
tickets” available to the population outside of the party promotion machine. Although party 
membership was a plus for an applicant, it was not a prerequisite for admission and higher education is 
therefore a distinct alternative to activist service. 
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Labor force, L it, is present in (32) as the denominator for the other variables (except 
investment and physicians per capita). The theoretical model deals with the numbers of 
activists and bosses as shares of labor force, and the wage (retail divided by labor). 
Enrollment and housing also should be measured with respect to the total labor force. 
Therefore, the net effect of the labor force is given by:  
(33)  βNL = β1  + β3 + β4 + β6 + β8 – 1. 
This net effect should equal zero if the linearized model (29) is sufficiently accurate and the 
proxies for the change in capital-labor ratio are adequate.  
Predictions of the promotion contract model with respect to the empirical specification 
(32) are summarized in Table 2.  
4.2. Estimation results 
The model (32) is estimated using the feasible GLS method with three error term 
specifications: random effects, cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional 
correlation.31 Specifications with salaries and numbers of bosses imputed using the two 
methods described in Section 3.3 yield similar results, although the second method 
(regression) produces coefficients with higher levels of significance. Only the results from the 
estimations that rely on the second method are reported. Both proxies for the change in 
capital-labor ratio produce similar results (reported in Table 3a), with the exception of the 
effect of investment itself, which has higher significance if log change in investment rate is 
                                                 
31 First-differencing practically removes cross-sectional variation: between-variance accounts for less 
than two percent of the overall variance in ∆ln(Na it). If (32) is estimated using fixed effects, the null 
hypothesis (all fixed effects equal zero) cannot be rejected. I also find no evidence of first-order serial 
correlation. These two types of specifications are not reported in this paper.  
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used (columns (4-6) in Table 3a). All these estimates are robust against sample selection. In 
particular, truncation of the time period on either or both sides or removal of one to four 
cross-sections at random does not affect the sign and the order of magnitude of any parameter 
estimate. Experimenting with various subperiod dummies, I find that an additional constant 
for the years after 1961 improves the results most significantly. Estimates with the After_1961 
dummy are reported in Table 3b.  
The signs and magnitudes (whenever applicable) of the parameter estimates are 
consistent with the promotion contract model. The number of bosses, Nb, has a positive 
coefficient as expected. Bureaucratic rent (boss salary), R. also has positive effect, although 
its significance is low. Signs and magnitudes of both investment indicators are consistent with 
the production technology with low elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. Net 
effects of labor force, insignificantly different from zero, suggests that linearized model (29) 
is appropriate. The variables that measure public consumption – enrollment in higher 
education institutions, ST, new public housing construction, NH, and physicians per capita, 
PH, – also have expected signs or are insignificant (NH). These effects provide additional 
support for the theoretical result that the wages of the working population (broadly 
conceived) should have a destimulating effect on the supply of activists. This result can be 
also considered within the framework of the models of political dictatorship discussed in the 
Introduction (Grossman and Noh, 1994; Wintrobe, 1998). Their prediction that the power-
maximizing dictatorship should produce public goods that are valued by the population in 
order to buy loyalty of the latter is not supported by my results. The approach employed in 
this paper produces the results that are in a better agreement with the data. Enrollment, ST, 
can be also interpreted, as I argue earlier, as an indicator of the availability of alternative 
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opportunities for vertical income mobility which was not introduced explicitly in the 
theoretical model. The negative effect of this variable is in agreement with this interpretation. 
It can be argued, however, that the ruling bureaucracy values an educated ‘cadre’ and, 
therefore, higher education increases the chances for promotion and/or is one possible sort of 
reward for the activists. This contradicts the alternative-opportunity function of higher 
education. The low significance of ST in most specifications can be, therefore, considered as 
resulting from the counteraction of the two effects of the higher education on the incentives to 
join the party. Finally, significant negative estimates of the After_1961 dummy can be 
explained by the elevated expectations of promotion on the part of the activists due to the 
temporary increase in the rate of turnover within the bureaucracy in 1956-61, when Stalin’s 
cohort of bosses was largely forced to retire. 
A distinctive feature of the results is the higher significance of variables that 
correspond to the negative stimuli to join the party (retail sales, enrollment in higher 
education, etc.) vs. low significance of positive ones (the number of bosses and their average 
salary). The contribution of the latter into the explained variation is one order of magnitude 
lower than that of the former. Although the proxy for bureaucratic rents used here – salary – 
accounts for only a portion of the total remuneration of the bureaucrats, there might be a more 
general explanation for the relative strength of the “push” to seek for political careers, as 
opposed to the “pull” of expected rents. The variables that determine the latter are far from 
perfectly observable for a worker considering the choice to become an activist. The 
information on the number of positions in the bureaucracy and the bosses’ salaries and 
benefits is hardly public domain under any non-democratic regime. It could be acquired 
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indirectly and distorted in transmission. Given the high noise-to-signal ratio for this type of 
information and the large gap between the bureaucratic rents and the consumption of an 
ordinary worker, it is not surprising that the elasticity of response to the short-term 
fluctuations in the latter is much higher. An important corollary to this finding is that future 
empirical research on hierarchical regimes is not going to be significantly hampered by the 
lack of access to the data that pertain to the opaque higher tiers of the ruling bureaucracies, as 
long as economic variables corresponding to the negative incentives can be observed.  
In part, these results reconfirm earlier findings by Schnytzer and Sustersic (1998) for 
the former Yugoslavia. The essence of their findings is that the lower wages and employment, 
the higher the supply of activists, as revealed in the party recruitment rates. In other words: 
the worse for the country, the better for the bureaucracy. The negative treatment effect of the 
post-1961 period indirectly contradicts the positive effect of repression on the support for the 
regime identified by these authors, since it was the period of 1956-61 that was characterized 
by more liberal policies in the Soviet Union. My results are also in general agreement with the 
results of the cross-country studies by Feng and Zak (1999) and Barro (1999), although the 
difference in theoretical premises and variable definitions makes a direct comparison difficult. 
Both studies reveal positive correlation between low inequality and high level of education 
with the probability of democratic transitions (the former) or propensity for democracy (the 
latter). Both these findings and my results are consistent with the assumption of the rent-
maximizing ruling bureaucracy and the rational population, responsive to promotion 
incentives. The analysis in this paper, however, shows clearly that both sides of the political 
labor market influence the observed outcomes significantly. Economic incentives for both 
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incumbent bureaucrats and activists determine the equilibrium number of party candidates 
under a hierarchical regime. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Collective bureaucratic control rights over the economy, as opposed to private 
property rights, create the possibilities for the incumbent bureaucracy to “buy” support and 
rent-augmenting services of the activists in exchange for promises of deferred promotion. 
Institutional forms that facilitate the political-economic exchange of this type vary historically 
and across countries. What they all have in common is the turnover within the hierarchical 
ruling stratum and implicit promotion contracts that provide participation incentives for both 
the workers and the ruling bureaucracy. Efficiency of this exchange is a function of the 
income gap between workers and bureaucrats: the more thorough the bureaucratic control 
over the paths of upward income mobility in the society, the closer its position is to the 
monopsony in the political labor market, the more rents can the bureaucracy capture. It also 
depends on production technology. Activists’ supervisory service is essentially a labor-
augmenting technology. In an economy with low elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital, this produces a positive correlation between the bureaucrats’ demand for activists and 
public investment.  
The two groups of factors affecting the supply of activists and the rulers’ demand for 
activist services are responsible for the emergence of hierarchical regimes. Most such regimes 
were established in the 20th century in the countries that were characterized by high inequality 
and were facing developmental challenges (Russia, China, Iran, etc.) or were experiencing 
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prolonged economic stagnation (Germany, Spain). The same factors can lie behind 
endogenous democratic transitions. The regime analyzed in this paper, USSR in the 1950s-
60s, is an example of a stable hierarchical regime, probably far removed from its bosses’ 
participation constraint. However, we are able to observe the impact of the economic 
parameters of the promotion contract on the political. Economic development may bring the 
equilibrium of such a regime to its participation constraint thus causing a political transition. 
In fact, the general logic of modern economic development makes this political development 
inevitable. On the one hand, as an economy on the modern growth path becomes more 
complex, the rulers gradually lose control over the earnings. If the rates of economic growth 
are relatively low, then the bureaucratic premium will decrease. If the rates are high, the 
expectations of sustained growth are likely to make the certain earnings of ordinary workers 
preferable to the lottery of activist service. In either case the supply of activists is affected 
adversely. On the other hand, the demand effect of investment policy fades away with the 
accumulation of capital in an economy with a low elasticity of capital-labor substitution. 
Adoption of modern labor-substituting technologies reverses this effect altogether. Again, in 
either case the economic foundation of a hierarchical regime is bound to decay. It should be 
added that throughout this paper the promotion contract was assumed enforcible, while in fact 
neither it can be enforced by a third-party due to its implicit nature nor it is in general self-
enforcing. Autocracy (personal dictatorship) can prevent the bureaucrats from renegotiating 
the contract thus undermining long-term stability of a regime. However, in the absence of an 
extreme threat to the regime, the costs borne by individual bureaucrats under dictatorial rule 
are excessive, and they choose oligarchic rule. Unable to keep the tenures of incumbents from 
rising, it accelerates the movement towards the abolition of the hierarchical regime in an 
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economy at a sufficiently high level of development. A scenario of this kind realized in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Simultaneous analysis of political variables and 
economic parameters of the promotion contract could also shed a light on the prospects of the 
contemporary political monopolies such as China, North Korea, and Iran. 
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Tables 
Table 1a. Imputation of boss salaries; regression model. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p-level 
OBLAST 2.1024 0.3416 0.0005 
INDEPENDENT_CITY 0.5523 0.0610 (0) 
SALARY_NATIONAL 0.9226 0.0172 (0) 
URBAN_DISTRICT 2.4715 0.3155 0.0001 
ALL_CITIES -0.4402 0.1466 0.0199 
ALL_CITIES*AZERBAI -0.2294 0.0784 0.0222 
ALL_CITIES*BELARUS -0.2633 0.1068 0.0433 
ALL_CITIES*ESTONIA 0.3361 0.0753 0.0029 
ALL_CITIES*GEORGIA -0.3007 0.0797 0.0070 
ALL_CITIES*LATVIA 0.2558 0.0982 0.0352 
ALL_CITIES*UZBEK -0.5832 0.1269 0.0025 
 R2 = 0.9867 
 
Table 1b. Imputation of number of bosses; regression model. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p-level 
RURAL_DISTRICT 8.0712 0.9059 (0) 
BOSSES_NATIONAL 0.0081 0.0009 (0) 
ALL_CITIES -11.4004 4.7940 0.0414 
ALL_CITIES*AZERBAI 21.4338 3.2951 0.0001 
ALL_CITIES*BELARUS 36.5713 4.2045 (0) 
ALL_CITIES*ESTONIA 8.1200 2.5207 0.0105 
ALL_CITIES*GEORGIA 20.9038 3.1715 0.0001 
ALL_CITIES*LATVIA 14.5777 3.3752 0.0019 
ALL_CITIES*UZBEK 47.8951 3.7113 (0) 
R2 = 0.9988 
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Table 2. Expected effects in the empirical model 
 
Variable Expected effect  
Number of bosses > 0 
Average boss salary > 0 
Retail sales < 0 
Students < 0 
Physicians per capita ≤ 0 
New housing  ≤ 0 
Investment (0, 1) 
Labor force, net effect 0 
Table 3a. Estimation results. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 
 
0.0280 
(0.0613) 
 
– 0.0175 
(0.0456) 
 
0.0372 
(0.0654) 
 
0.0684 
(0.0521) 
 
0.0382 
(0.0372) 
 
0.0801 
(0.0568) 
 
Number of bosses 
 
0.5774*** 
(0.2227) 
 
0.3239 
(0.2049) 
 
0.5606** 
(0.2457) 
 
0.4589** 
(0.2214) 
 
0.2632 
(0.1940) 
 
0.4664* 
(0.2401) 
 
Average boss 
salary 
 
0.4252 
(0.4278) 
 
0.2998 
(0.3318) 
 
0.3848 
(0.4711) 
 
0.4752 
(0.4368) 
 
0.2223 
(0.2951) 
 
0.4558 
(0.4613) 
 
Retail sales 
 
– 1.4120***
(0.4587) 
 
– 0.4808 
(0.3541) 
 
– 1.4476***
(0.4940) 
 
– 1.3328***
(0.4464) 
 
– 0.5925* 
(0.3201) 
 
– 1.4012***
(0.4851) 
 
New housing  
 
– 0.0143 
(0.1040) 
 
0.0278 
(0.0559) 
 
0.0056 
(0.1177) 
 
– 0.0117 
(0.1038) 
 
– 0.0105 
(0.0569) 
 
– 0.0001 
(0.1140) 
 
Physicians per 
capita 
 
– 1.1415** 
(0.5540) 
 
– 0.4954 
(0.3209) 
 
– 1.0911* 
(0.6109) 
 
– 0.8666 
(0.5452) 
 
– 0.6055** 
(0.3094) 
 
– 0.8351 
(0.5678) 
 
Students 
 
– 0.6093** 
(0.2865) 
 
– 0.4236**
(0.1835) 
 
– 0.5329* 
(0.3149) 
 
– 0.6835** 
(0.2734) 
 
– 0.5730*** 
(0.1628) 
 
– 0.6104** 
(0.3033) 
 
Investment 
 
0.0888* 
(0.0484) 
 
0.0682* 
(0.0409) 
 
0.0788 
(0.0524) 
 
0.3629** 
(0.1483) 
 
0.2621*** 
(0.0706) 
 
0.3469** 
(0.1564) 
 
Labor force 
 
2.6532*** 
(0.5922) 
 
1.7546*** 
(0.3219) 
 
2.4696*** 
(0.6364) 
 
2.5069*** 
(0.5986) 
 
1.7100*** 
(0.3002) 
 
2.2844*** 
(0.6377) 
 
Labor force, 
net effect 
 
0.1950 
(0.7277) 
 
0.2019 
(0.4503) 
 
0.0554 
(0.7985) 
 
0.0623 
(0.7245) 
 
0.2027 
(0.4077) 
 
0.2609 
(0.7885) 
 
 
R2 
 
0.283 
 
0.237 
 
0.285 
 
0.303 
 
0.267 
 
0.305 
 
 
Notes:  
1) Standard errors in parentheses. 
2) Error term specifications: (1-2), (4-5) – cross-sectional heteroskedasticity; (2), (5) – cross-sectional 
correlation; (3), (6) – random effects..  
3) Investment: (1-3) – log (I/L); (4-6) – ∆ ln(I/Y).  
4) Significance: * – 10%, ** – 5%, *** – 1%.  
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Table 3b. Estimation results (with time period dummies). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 
 
0.1196** 
(0.0532) 
 
0.1274*** 
(0.0490) 
 
0.1220** 
(0.0587) 
 
After 1961 
 
– 0.1004*** 
(0.0361) 
 
– 0.1257*** 
(0.0478) 
 
– 0.0904** 
(0.0404) 
 
Number of bosses 
 
0.6692*** 
(0.2212) 
 
0.4328** 
(0.1859) 
 
0.6431*** 
(0.2479) 
 
Average boss salary 
 
0.8327* 
(0.4260) 
 
0.4386 
(0.2704) 
 
0.7239 
(0.4670) 
 
Retail sales 
 
– 0.7922* 
(0.4769) 
 
– 0.3916 
(0.3078) 
 
– 0.8910* 
(0.5267) 
 
New housing  
 
– 0.1447 
(0.1066) 
 
– 0.1016* 
(0.0577) 
 
– 0.1083 
(0.1216) 
 
Physicians per capita 
 
– 1.1092** 
(0.5191) 
 
– 0.7823*** 
(0.2990) 
 
– 0.9642* 
(0.5586) 
 
Students 
 
– 0.3384 
(0.3025) 
 
– 0.3270** 
(0.1595) 
 
– 0.2858 
(0.3304) 
 
Investment 
 
0.3442** 
(0.1410) 
 
0.2441*** 
(0.0639) 
 
0.3352** 
(0.1531) 
 
Labor force 
 
1.8242*** 
(0.6313) 
 
1.3426*** 
(0.2988) 
 
1.6451** 
(0.6865) 
 
Labor force, 
net effect 
 
0.2181 
(0.7054) 
 
– 0.0448 
(0.4198) 
 
0.0031 
(0.7805) 
 
 
R2 
 
0.339 
 
0.314 
 
0.342 
 
 
Notes:  
1) Standard errors in parentheses. 
2) Error term specifications: (1-2) – cross-sectional heteroskedasticity; (2) – cross-sectional correlation; 
(3) – random effects..  
3) Investment: ∆ ln(I/Y).  
4) Significance: * – 10%, ** – 5%, *** – 1%. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Geometry of a promotion contract. 
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Figure 2. Configuration of X(Na) and Y(Na) and the equilibrium number of activists. 
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Figure 3. Bosses’ participation constraint and the point of regime change.
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Figure 4. Approximation of X(Na) for CES production function.  
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